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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 
Public Justice is a national public interest law firm dedicated to preserving 
access to justice, remedying government and corporate wrongdoing, and holding 
the powerful accountable in courts.  As part of its access-to-justice work, Public 
Justice created an Iqbal Project in 2009 to combat misuse of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).  The Project tracks 
developments in the case law and provides assistance to counsel facing Iqbal-based 
motions.  Public Justice is concerned that overbroad readings of Iqbal threaten to 
deny justice to many injured plaintiffs with meritorious claims.   
In addition to Public Justice’s Iqbal-related interest in this case, the firm also 
represents prisoners, arrestees, other detainees, their family members, and other 
plaintiffs in a variety of cases involving constitutional claims.  See, e.g., Hui v. 
Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845 (2010); Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2010); 
Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005); Everett v. Cherry, No. 
08-00622 (E.D. Va.) (case pending).  Public Justice is concerned that Appellants’ 
arguments regarding supervisory liability will, if accepted, prevent many plaintiffs 
with constitutional claims from obtaining a full remedy.   
The Legal Aid Society of the City of New York is a private organization that 
has provided free legal assistance to indigent persons in New York City for over 
125 years.  Through its Prisoners’ Rights Project, the Society seeks to ensure that 
2 
 
prisoners’ constitutional and statutory rights are protected.  The Society advocates 
on behalf of prisoners in the New York City jails and New York state prisons, and 
conducts litigation on prison conditions.  The Society often litigates claims of 
supervisory liability. 
The Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project is a private not-for-profit 
organization created to ensure equal access to justice for indigent institutionalized 
persons.  Part of the Pennsylvania Legal Aid Network, the Institutional Law 
Project provides direct representation services, self-help and other legal materials, 
and class representation to eligible low-income residents of Pennsylvania’s 
prisons, jails, state hospitals, and state centers.  The Project also takes part in 




SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Amici Public Justice, the Prisoners’ Rights Project of the Legal Aid Society 
of the City of New York, and the Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project file this 
brief in support of Appellees Maria Argueta, Walter Chavez, Ana Galindo, W.C., 
                                         
1
 All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.  No party’s counsel 
authored the brief in whole or in part.  No party or party’s counsel contributed 
money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief.  No person—
other than amici, their members, or their counsel—contributed money that was 
intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief.    
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Arturo Flores, Bybyana Arias, Juan Ontaneda, Veronica Covias, and Yesica 
Guzman.   
Appellants make an untenable argument about the availability of supervisory 
liability after Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009):  they suggest that recovery 
against supervisory officials is permissible only when those officials participate 
directly in the same unconstitutional misconduct committed by their subordinates.  
Appellants’ Br. 18 (emphasizing that the supervisory defendants are not alleged to 
have themselves ―searched or seized . . . the plaintiffs or participated in or 
planned‖ the home raids).  In this extreme view, which is contrary to decades of 
Third Circuit case law, neither a supervisor’s knowledge of and acquiescence in a 
subordinate’s wrongful conduct, nor a failure to respond to a pattern of unlawful 
activity, is ever sufficient to hold a supervisor liable in an action pursuant to Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971).  Appellants’ Br. 17, 24.   
Appellants’ position should be rejected for at least four reasons.  First, it 
finds no support in the reasoning or language of Iqbal, which acknowledged that a 
supervisor may still be liable for ―violations arising from his or her superintendent 
responsibilities.‖  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.  At most, Iqbal rejected a ―knowledge 
and acquiescence‖ theory of supervisory liability for equal protection claims 
because in equal protection cases, plaintiffs must show intentional discrimination, 
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not merely knowledge.  Id. at 1948–49.  There is no equal protection claim at issue 
here.   
Second, Appellants’ extreme view is inconsistent with the approach taken by 
the vast majority of lower courts, which have held that supervisors may violate the 
Constitution in different ways than subordinates, either because the supervisors’ 
duties are different or because the supervisors’ conduct is governed by different 
legal standards.  Failing to recognize that fact will obstruct the enforcement of 
constitutional norms by immunizing supervisory misconduct that is often a more 
fundamental and persistent cause of constitutional violations than the direct 
conduct of line employees.   
Third, adoption of Appellants’ position would effectively eliminate 
supervisory liability altogether, notwithstanding numerous examples of the 
importance of supervisory liability in remedying, deterring, and enjoining ongoing 
constitutional violations.   
Finally, Appellants’ position on supervisory liability is sharply at odds with 
the position taken by the United States Department of Justice in its affirmative 







I. Iqbal Did Not Eliminate Supervisory Liability As It Has Existed in the 
Third Circuit. 
In the Third Circuit, it is well-settled that government officials with 
superintendent responsibilities may be held liable for constitutional violations in 
many circumstances not involving their direct participation in subordinates’ 
misconduct.  For example, supervisors may be liable when they had ―actual 
knowledge of and acquiesce[d]‖ in subordinates’ misconduct, Baker v. Monroe 
Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1194 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1995), ―tolerated past or ongoing‖ 
misconduct, id. at 1191 n.3, directed or encouraged such misconduct, see A.M. ex 
rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Detention Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 
2004), and when, ―with deliberate indifference to the consequences,‖ they 
―established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused . . . 
constitutional harm.‖  Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 
1989).  This Court has made clear that there must be a causal connection between 
the supervisors’ acts or omissions and the plaintiff’s injury, see, e.g., Brown v. 
Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001), Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 
1099, 1188 (3d Cir. 1989), but direct participation in subordinates’ misconduct has 
never been required. 
Nothing in Iqbal undermines the Third Circuit’s approach.  In Iqbal, the 
Court started its review of the supervisory claims in that case by noting that the 
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plausibility of any claim is context-specific.  129 S. Ct. at 1948, 1950.  In Iqbal 
itself, the only causes of action before the Court were Bivens claims for 
discrimination alleged against former Attorney General Ashcroft and Federal 
Bureau of Investigation Director Robert Mueller.  Id. at 1948–49.  In that context, 
the Supreme Court held that a ―knowledge and acquiescence‖ theory of 
supervisory liability was inappropriate because constitutional discrimination claims 
depend on proof of the defendant’s own discriminatory purpose.  Id. at 1949.  That 
is, a supervisor who has only knowingly acquiesced in a subordinate’s conduct, but 
who lacks discriminatory intent, simply has not violated the prohibition on 
intentional discrimination.  Id. 
In reaching that limited and context-specific conclusion, the Supreme Court 
expressed no intent to eviscerate supervisory liability in its entirety or to require 
supervisors’ direct participation in the unconstitutional conduct of their 
subordinates.  The Court noted that supervisory liability is a ―misnomer‖ to the 
extent that it suggests that a supervisor may be liable solely because of the 
misconduct of a subordinate.  Id. at 1949.  But only two sentences later it also 
made clear that an official may be held liable for ―violations arising from his or her 
superintendent responsibilities.‖  Id. (emphasis supplied).  That language cannot be 




Iqbal did hold, as Appellants note, that to be liable under Bivens, supervisors 
must violate the Constitution themselves.  But case law demonstrates that there are 
many ways in which supervisory governmental officials can violate the 
Constitution, often without engaging in exactly the same conduct as their 
subordinates (or acting with exactly the same culpable state of mind).  For 
example, while subordinate correction officers who use force directly against 
inmates violate the constitution when they behave ―maliciously and sadistically for 
the very purpose of causing harm,‖ Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) 
(quotation marks omitted), the officials responsible for supervising such officers 
violate the Constitution if, without using any force themselves, they exhibit 
deliberate indifference to the risk that their subordinates will inflict force 
intentionally and unnecessarily upon detainees.  Valdes v. Crosby, 450 F.3d 1231, 
1243–44 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. dismissed, 549 U.S. 1249 (2007); Curry v. Scott, 
249 F.3d 493, 506 n.5 (6th Cir. 2001); Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 264–65 
(2d Cir. 1999); White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 280 (8th Cir. 1994) (claim against 
supervisor in use of force case decided under deliberate indifference standard); 
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1249–51 (N.D. Cal. 1995).  Although all the 
defendants in such a case are in violation of the Constitution, their constitutional 
violations are established with different evidence precisely because they occupy 
different levels of the correctional hierarchy. 
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In the instant case, as in the above example, the supervisory defendants may 
be held liable for their own unconstitutional misconduct even though it is not 
exactly the same as the misconduct of their subordinates.  Specifically, Appellants 
allegedly took no action to correct or modify policies or to institute training in the 
face of repeated unconstitutional misconduct by their subordinates.  JA 538–42 
(Second Amended Compl. ¶¶33–42).  Because the underlying violations are of 
Fourth Amendment rights, the supervisors may be held liable under Iqbal’s logic if 
their objectively unreasonable behavior—including failure to act upon knowledge 
of past and ongoing Fourth Amendment violations by subordinates—was a cause 
of future Fourth Amendment violations by subordinates.  In this circumstance, the 
supervisors have themselves violated the Fourth Amendment:  no objectively 
reasonable supervisor would fail to act in the face of information that subordinates 
were routinely violating the Constitution.
2
   
Nothing about this liability regime is any way inconsistent with Iqbal’s 
reminder that supervisors are only ―liable for [their] own misconduct.‖  129 S. Ct. 
at 1949.  To the contrary, it is Appellants who would, in effect, amend the Court’s 
language to add the modifier ―liable for [their] own misconduct by directly injuring 
detainees in the exact same way as their subordinates.‖  That standard is 
                                         
2
 In this particular scenario, the state of mind required to establish culpability 
(objective unreasonableness) happens to be the same for both the supervisors and 
subordinates, although that is not always the case, as discussed above.   
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inconsistent with Iqbal’s recognition that high-level officials can be liable for 
violating their ―superintendent responsibilities,‖ id., and finds no support anywhere 
else in the Supreme Court’s decision. 
II. Appellants’ Argument Is Contrary to the Holdings of the 
Overwhelming Majority of Post-Iqbal Decisions.   
Many appellate and district courts have considered the scope of supervisory 
liability after Iqbal, and the overwhelming majority have reached conclusions 
inconsistent with Appellants’ view. 
The Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185 
(10th Cir. 2010), provides a useful example.  The court conducted an extensive 
analysis of the impact of Iqbal on supervisory liability and came to several 
conclusions that bear on the instant case.  First, the court made clear that the 
―personal involvement‖ requirement for §1983 actions may be satisfied without an 
official’s ―direct participation‖ in unconstitutional conduct.  Id. at 1195.  Although 
the Dodds court based this conclusion in part on an interpretation of the word 
―causes‖ in §1983, the Supreme Court treats Bivens and §1983 claims 
interchangeably for personal involvement purposes.  See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.  
Second, the Tenth Circuit concluded that a plaintiff could demonstrate a 
supervisor’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation, post-Iqbal, by 
showing that the supervisor ―promulgated, created, implemented or possessed 
responsibility for the continued operation‖ of a challenged constitutional violation.  
10 
 
Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1199 (emphasis added).  And finally, the court held that to be 
liable, in addition to being personally involved, there must be a causal link between 
the supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional violation, and the supervisor must 
act with the state of mind ―required to establish the alleged constitutional 
deprivation.‖  Id.  In Dodds, this meant that the supervisor had to act with 
deliberate indifference, because the challenge involved an alleged substantive due 
process violation.  Id. at 1205. 
Other circuits have reached similar conclusions after Iqbal.  The First, Sixth, 
Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have all held that supervisors may be liable in 
circumstances that do not involve direct participation in subordinates’ misconduct 
or direct contact with the plaintiff.  See Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 
48–49 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that supervisors may be liable either as direct 
participants or by exhibiting deliberate indifference that contributes to a civil rights 
violation); Wright v. Leis, No. 08-3037, 335 F. App’x 552, 2009 WL 1853752, at 
*3 (6th Cir. June 30, 2009) (per curiam) (accepting failure to train as a viable 
theory for claim against supervisor where jail detainee alleged he was subjected to 
excessive force by line officer); Langford v. Norris, 614 F.3d 445, 463–64 (8th Cir. 
2010) (holding that supervisors who ignored complaints of deficient medical care 
could be liable for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment); al-Kidd 
v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 965 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted on other grounds, 131 
11 
 
S. Ct. 415 (2010) (acknowledging viability of knowledge and acquiescence theory 
of liability); Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward County, Fla., 604 F.3d 1248, 1266–67 
(11th Cir. 2010) (recognizing the possibility of supervisory liability based on a 
failure to correct widespread abuse or the creation of a custom or policy that results 
in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights); see also Keating v. City of 
Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 764–65 (11th Cir. 2010) (supervisors violate the Constitution 
when they know of unconstitutional conduct or that subordinates will act 
unconstitutionally, possess the power to order their subordinates to cease, but fail 
to do so).
3
   
The Seventh Circuit has taken a similar position, rejecting a deliberate-
indifference theory for an equal-protection claim but limiting that holding to the 
equal-protection context and confirming that deliberate indifference remains a 
viable theory for other claims.  T.E. v. Grindle, 599 F.3d 583, 588–91 (7th Cir. 
2010).  None of these cases can be squared with Appellants’ view that supervisors 
                                         
3
 See also Pruitt v. Clark, No. 1:07-cv-01709, 2010 WL 3063254, at *5 
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2010) (finding allegation that supervisors knew of and failed to 
halt cross-gender strip searches by their subordinates sufficient to state a claim for 
violation of Fourth Amendment); Herrera v. Hall, No. 1:08-cv-01882, 2010 WL 
2791586, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2010) (approving of liability under the Eighth 
Amendment where supervisor knew about impending violation and ―had the 
authority and opportunity to prevent the ongoing violation,‖ but failed to do so); 
Coscia ex rel. Estate of Coscia v. Town of Pembroke, Mass., 715 F. Supp. 2d 212, 
227–28 (D. Mass 2010) (applying deliberate indifference standard after Iqbal); 
Dotson v. Stultz, No. 1:07-cv-164, 2009 WL 2058820, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. July 6, 
2009) (noting that supervisors may be liable when they cause a constitutional 
violation by, inter alia, failing to discharge a supervisory duty).   
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must violate the Constitution in the exact same way as their subordinates in order 
to be held liable.  See, e.g., id. at 591 (―When a state actor’s deliberate indifference 
deprives someone of his or her protected liberty interest in bodily integrity, that 
actor violates the Constitution, regardless of whether the actor is a supervisor or 
subordinate . . . .‖). 
The Second Circuit has yet to squarely address the issue, but several district 
courts within the circuit have held that Iqbal affects supervisory liability only in 
intentional discrimination cases.  See Qasem v. Toro, No. 09 Civ. 8361, --- F. 
Supp. 2d ----, 2010 WL 3156031, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10. 2010) (the Second 
Circuit’s pre-Iqbal standards survive ―as long as they are consistent with the 
requirements applicable to the particular constitutional provision alleged to have 
been violated‖); Mason v. Hann, No. 01 Civ. 523, 2010 WL 3025669, at *5 n.4 
(S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2010) (pre-Iqbal standards apply in Fourth and Eighth 
Amendment cases but not in discrimination claims); D’Olimpio v. Crisafi, 09 Civ. 
7283, 09 Civ. 9952, 2010 WL 2428128, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2010) 
(reaching the same conclusion as in Qasem); see also Tafari v. McCarthy, 714 F. 
Supp. 2d 317, 342–43 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (court is persuaded that pre-Iqbal standard 
still applies, at least in deliberate indifference context); McCarroll v. Fed. Bureau 
of Prisons, No. 9:08-cv-1343, 2010 WL 4609379, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) 
(pre-Iqbal standard ―may‖ still apply except in intentional discrimination cases); 
13 
 
Sash v. United States, 674 F. Supp. 2d 531, 543–44 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (same).  
Others have assumed that the pre-Iqbal standards still apply or have applied them 
without comment.  See Cagle v. Gravlin, No. 9:09-cv-0648, 2010 WL 2088267, at 
*7 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2010) (stating that Iqbal arguably casts doubt on Second 
Circuit’s standard but assuming that it still applies); Hardy v. Diaz, No. 9:08-cv-
1352, 2010 WL 1633379, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2010) (applying Second 
Circuit’s pre-Iqbal law); Robinson v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 08-CV-902, 
2010 WL 1752587, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2010) (applying Second Circuit’s 
standard without referring to Iqbal); see also Rahman v. Fischer, No. 08 Civ. 4368, 
2010 WL 1063835, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2010) (collecting cases).  But see 
Spear v. Hugles, No. 08 Civ. 4026, 2009 WL 2176725, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 
2009) (assuming that only two of the five Second Circuit supervisory liability 
standards survive Iqbal); Bellamy v. Mount Vernon Hosp., No. 07 Civ. 1801, 2009 
WL 1835939 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009) (same). 
District courts in the Third Circuit have also rejected the idea that Iqbal 
eviscerated supervisory liability and have continued to uphold claims based on a 
supervisor’s knowledge and acquiescence.  See Zion v. Nassan, No. 09-383, --- F. 
Supp. 2d ----, 2010 WL 2926218, at *17–18 (W.D. Pa. July 23, 2010) (applying 
knowledge and acquiescence standard in Fourth Amendment excessive force case); 
Mincy v. McConnell, No. 09 Civ. 236, 2010 WL 3092681, at *4 (W.D. Pa. July 15, 
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2010) (permitting liability based on knowledge and acquiescence theory); Liberty 
and Prosperity 1776, Inc. v. Corzine, No. 08-2642, 2010 WL 2557212, at *4–6 (D. 
N.J. June 24, 2010) (recognizing that knowledge and acquiescence standard may 
be sufficient for some First Amendment claims, depending on whether 
discriminatory purpose is essential to claim); Bullock v. Beard, No. 3:10-cv-401, 
2010 WL 1507228, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2010) (applying knowledge and 
acquiescence standard to Eighth Amendment claim).
4
 
In short, Appellants’ extreme position is contrary to the overwhelming 
majority of post-Iqbal case law. 
III. The Availability of Supervisory Liability Is Critical To Deterring 
Constitutional Violations and Compensating Victims of Those 
Violations. 
The lack of legal support for Appellants’ position is sensible, given the 
critical role that supervisory liability has played in ensuring that civil rights 
violations are adequately deterred and that victims of egregious violations are 
sufficiently compensated.  It would strain the Court’s indulgence (and its Rules) to 
enumerate the many varied instances in which the availability of liability for 
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 District courts within the Fourth Circuit have also permitted supervisory 
liability claims where the supervisor did not directly participate in the violation, 
but where the supervisors knew of and remained indifferent to the violations by 
their subordinate.  See Mitchell v. Rappahannock Regional Jail Auth., 703 F. Supp. 
2d 549 (E.D.Va. 2010) (Eighth Amendment violations); Massenburg v. Adams, 08 
Civ. 106, 2010 WL 1279087 (E.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2010) (religious exercise case). 
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supervisors has proven important to deterrence and compensation, so this brief will 
highlight only some of the relevant cases. 
We start with the principle that deterrence and compensation are the 
recognized twin goals of both Bivens and Section 1983 litigation.  The Bivens 
Court itself focused on the need for compensating the victims of wrongdoing.  See 
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396–97; id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring) (―For people in 
Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.‖).  Subsequent to Bivens, the Court 
identified an interest in deterrence as another basis for the cause of action.  See 
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001) (―The purpose of Bivens is 
to deter individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations.‖); 
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980) (―Bivens . . . in addition to compensating 
victims, serves a deterrent purpose.‖); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 505–06 
(1978) (declining to provide absolute immunity to federal executive officials under 
Bivens because doing so would eviscerate deterrent effect). 
Ensuring that supervisors are liable for their constitutional violations has 
historically been important to meeting both goals of civil rights damages litigation.  
When a plaintiff has suffered a constitutional injury caused by the conduct of both 
direct participants and supervisory officials, compensation from all parties is just 
and sometimes necessary to ensure a complete remedy.  For instance, when a line 
officer has insufficient funds to compensate an injured plaintiff fully, a supervisor 
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who is also culpable may be able to fill the gap.  Moreover, there may be 
circumstances when line officers are not available to pay damages (e.g., because 
they cannot be identified or because of a lack of indemnification) but supervisors 
are.  See, e.g., Brenes-Laroche v. Toledo Davila, 682 F. Supp. 2d 179, 186–88 (D. 
P.R. 2010) (subordinate officers removed their badges before using unlawful force 
to hide their identities). 
Supervisors may also be more subject to the deterrent effect of individual 
liability and more important to deter, given their greater authority, greater 
institutional affiliation with their employing agencies, better access to information 
necessary to prevent constitutional violations, and their responsibility to ensure that 
line-officer staff are properly trained and supervised.  See, e.g., Butz, 438 U.S. at 
505–506 (emphasizing the importance of liability for high-ranking officials 
because they may exercise authority over subordinates with respect to ―a wide 
range of projects‖ and their ―greater power . . . affords a greater potential for a 
regime of lawless conduct‖); see also infra Part IV.  Indeed, analogous to well-
accepted principles of common-law tort theory, supervisors are the ―cheapest cost 
avoider[s]‖ in the constitutional tort context.  Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, 
Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yale L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972); 
Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 
Va. L. Rev. 1291 (1992); cf. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex 
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Discrimination Laws, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1311, 1332 (1989) (―The most efficient 
method of discouraging sexual harassment may be by creating incentives for the 
employer to police the conduct of its supervisory employees, and this is done by 
making the employer liable.‖). 
The importance of maintaining supervisory liability is reflected in the case 
law.  Take as one example the well-documented problem of sexual abuse and rape 
in prisons.  See, e.g., Allen J. Beck & Paige M. Harrison, Sexual Victimization in 
Prisons & Jails Reported by Inmates, 2008–09 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, 2010).
5
  Prisoners who have been victimized by such abuse often 
have limited remedies against the direct participants—if the direct participants are 
other detainees, they will likely be judgment proof, and if they are correction 
officers, they will likely not be indemnified by their employing agencies.  See, e.g., 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §59:10-1 (state need not indemnify employee who committed 
―intentional wrong‖); N.Y. Pub. Officers Law Art. 2 §17 (same). 
In these circumstances, supervisors who violate the Constitution by 
exhibiting deliberate indifference to the risk that other inmates or prison employees 
will rape detainees are often the only wrongdoers who can be fully reached by the 
law.  Under the Appellants’ formulation in the instant case, however, even 
supervisors who know of and acquiesce in rape of prisoners will not be held liable 
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 Available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjri0809.pdf. 
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unless they participate directly in the rape or its planning.  According to 
Appellants’ view, liability would be inappropriate in all of the following cases:  
 When supervisors know of an officer’s history of sexual abuse but 
nonetheless assign him to posts with ―prolonged and unsupervised contact with 
female inmates, including the overnight shift in the sexual trauma unit.‖  Peddle v. 
Sawyer, 64 F. Supp. 2d 12, 18–19 (D. Conn. 1999). 
 When supervisors know of multiple instances of sexual assaults by a 
line officer and are aware of his ―obsession‖ with a specific inmate but take no 
steps to intervene.  Mitchell v. Rappahannock Regional Jail Auth., 703 F. Supp. 2d 
549, 559–60 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 When supervisors know of a subordinate’s long history of sexual 
abuse of prisoners, take no action in response, and one even admits intentionally 
not investigating for fear of what an investigation would uncover.  See White v. 
Ottinger, 442 F. Supp. 2d 236, 248–50 (E.D. Pa. 2006). 
 When supervisors provide no formal training to most subordinates 
concerning sexual harassment or proper contact with inmates, allowing 
subordinates ―essentially [to do] as they please[],‖ notwithstanding a history of 
complaints about staff sexual misconduct.  Hammond v. Gordon County, 316 F. 
Supp. 2d 1262, 1288–90 (N.D. Ga. 2002). 
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 When a supervisor does nothing to protect a prisoner from a known 
risk of sexual assault other than to tell her to stay around her friends and ―do 
anything you have to do to protect yourself.‖  Ortiz v. Voinovich, 211 F. Supp. 2d 
917, 924–26 (S.D. Ohio 2002), rev’d in part sub nom. Ortiz v. Jordan, 316 F. 
App’x 449 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. granted on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 2371 (2010).  
 When a sheriff who has already been put on notice by federal courts 
of his inadequate supervision and its contribution to two sexual assaults makes 
only minimal efforts to correct ―glaring‖ safety problems, fails to impose a serious 
threat of discipline for policy violations by staff, and fails to implement adequate 
training.  Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 918–20 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 When a supervisor is aware of past sexual misconduct allegations 
against a guard, believe the allegations are likely true and that it would be prudent 
to reassign the guard, yet does nothing to protect inmates from additional assaults. 
Riley v. Olk-Long, 282 F.3d 592, 595–96 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 When a warden, knowing of a guard’s many incidents of sexual 
misconduct, nonetheless allows him to resume his duties notwithstanding admitted 
concerns about inmates’ safety and concerns about the guard’s ―continued use of 
poor judgment.‖  Id. at 596–97.   
Even outside of the context of prison sexual abuse, supervisory liability 
claims have forced the exposure and examination—and, one can reasonably 
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expect, the correction in many cases—of practices or omissions by higher-level 
officials that exposed prisoners to an excessive risk of harm.  In these cases, 
supervisors and administrators are not held liable or potentially liable on a 
respondeat superior theory; rather, they are held responsible on the basis of their 
own deliberate indifference with regard to their ―superintendent responsibilities.‖  
One need only look to Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), in which the 
Supreme Court made clear that Bivens provides a remedy for Eighth Amendment 
violations, for an example of a supervisory liability theory that would be cast aside 
by Appellants.  After remand from the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs successfully 
argued that the medical director of the entire federal prison system could be liable 
for failing to remedy systemic deficiencies in prison medical care.  See Cleveland-
Perdue v. Brutsche, 881 F.2d 427, 430–31 (7th Cir. 1989).  Under Appellants’ 
direct-participation theory, Carlson and each of the following examples would no 
longer represent viable constitutional claims: 
 When a warden who knows of pattern of excessive force fails to take 
steps to address it, adopts a ―hands-off‖ approach, discontinues the practice of 
videotaping certain guard conduct, and fails to read inmate complaints.  Valdes, 
450 F.3d at 1237–44; see also Estate of Davis by Ostenfeld v. Delo, 115 F.3d 1388, 
1396 (8th Cir. 1997) (another example of a supervisor who failed to take action 
notwithstanding history of excessive force). 
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 When prison supervisors ignore a pattern of racial harassment by a 
subordinate.  Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 507–08 (6th Cir. 2001) 
 When a warden is ―fully advised both of the inhumane conditions of 
[a disabled prisoner’s] confinement and the failure to provide him with needed 
therapy,‖ but neglects to take any remedial steps.  LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 
394 (4th Cir. 1987) (Powell, J., sitting by designation) (cited with approval in 
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991)). 
Taken to its logical conclusion in the prison context, Appellants’ argument 
would also create a bizarre dichotomy between cases involving abuse by fellow 
inmates and abuse by guards.  In inmate-abuse cases, supervisors might still be 
liable under Appellants’ theory because both supervisory and subordinate 
defendants would violate the Constitution in the same way—by failing to protect 
some inmates from others.  See generally Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 
(1994).  But in guard-abuse cases, supervisors would be shielded from liability 
because of their failure to participate in constitutional violations in the same way as 
their subordinates, despite their deliberate indifference to their subordinates’ abuse.  
This kind of distinction lacks support in law, logic, and policy.   
Appellants’ argument, if accepted, would do real harm outside the prison 
context as well.  There are many examples in the case law of supervisory-liability 
claims against police officers and others that serve the compensatory and deterrent 
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purposes of civil rights litigation.  Under Appellants’ view, there would be no 
liability: 
 When a police chief fails to discipline officers for excessive force or 
to do anything to prevent unlawful force in the future and responds to a citizen’s 
many complaints about excessive force with a letter saying the complaints would 
not be sustained.  See Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 
1991). 
 When a police chief knows that a particular officer has been 
reprimanded for a constitutional violation, has been the subject of eight other 
complaints about violence in four years, but fails to provide any additional training 
or supervision.  Williams v. Santana, No. 09-10198, 340 F. App’x 614, 2009 WL 
2435053 (11th Cir. Aug. 11, 2009). 
 When a supervisor knows of multiple incidents in which a subordinate 
used excessive force prior to his killing a suspect and responds to complaints 
―callously and with apparent amusement.‖  Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799–801 
(4th Cir. 1994). 
 When supervisors joke about their subordinate’s propensity to use a 
Taser on citizens but nonetheless fail to train subordinates as to how to use the 
weapon properly.  See Ramirez v. Jim Wells County, Tex., No. 09 Civ. 209, 2010 
WL 2598304, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 25, 2010) (plaintiff alleged that supervisors 
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referred to subordinate as ―Taser Joe‖ and failed to train him in the use of his Taser 
gun). 
 When school officials fail to train special education teachers and fail 
to hire qualified staff to work in special education teachers, despite awareness of 
physical abuse of special education student, including beating, slapping, and 
slamming into a chair.  Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trustees, 479 
F.3d 1175, 1182–83 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 When supervisors approve without inquiry the retaliatory transfers of 
police officers who reported sex-based discrimination, even though the captain 
initiating the transfers is the principal alleged discriminator.  Keenan v. City of 
Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459, 462–63, 466–68, 472 (3d Cir. 1992) (upholding 
verdict in plaintiffs’ favor).  
 Where supervisors are aware of ongoing harassment of female 
officers, including use of lewd language, placement of pornographic pictures in 
officers’ work desks, and destruction of officers’ work product, but take no action 
to investigate or stop the conduct.  Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 
1472–75, 1478–79 (3d Cir. 1990). 
In sum, there are many examples in the case law of claims against 
supervisory officials that have played an important role in furthering the twin goals 
of Bivens and §1983 litigation—compensation and deterrence.  Appellants’ 
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extreme view would prevent Bivens and §1983 from serving their purpose in many 
significant cases. 
IV. The United States Itself Has Recognized the Importance of Holding 
Supervisors Accountable to Prevent Constitutional Violations. 
As part of its affirmative enforcement of constitutional standards through 
investigation of and litigation against state and local entities, the United States has 
recognized the importance of supervisory liability and has taken positions 
diametrically opposed to Appellants’ view here. 
Under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997a(a), the Department of Justice, through its Civil Rights Division (CRD), 
has statutory power to investigate and, where appropriate, institute civil actions to 
prevent state and local officials from violating the Constitution.  In almost all 
actions instituted by CRD pursuant to this authority, the United States has relied 
on, inter alia, allegations of supervisory involvement identical to those it derides as 
legally insufficient in the instant case. 
For example, in a lawsuit against Nassau County and supervisory 
defendants, the United States alleged that the defendants violated the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments by ―tolerat[ing] and condon[ing]‖ the use of excessive 
force against detainees, failing to train and supervise, failing to maintain adequate 
policies, failing to adequately investigate complaints and failing to discipline errant 
staff.  See Compl. ¶16, No. 2:02-cv-02382, United States v. Nassau County 
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(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2002).
6
  In a lawsuit against Columbus County, Georgia, the 
United States sought relief for violations of the Constitution caused by supervisory 
defendants’ failure to provide ―adequate staffing and staff training, and fail[ure] to 
develop and implement appropriate policies and procedures to safely operate the 
Jail.‖  See Compl. ¶14, United States v. Columbus Consol. City/County 
Government, No. 4:99-cv-00132 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 23, 1999).
7
  In a case against the 
State of Arizona, the United States relied upon a theory of supervisory liability 
where the defendants failed to provide adequate training and investigation of 
sexual misconduct by staff.  See Mem. Opp. Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., United 
States v. State of Ariz., No. 97-cv-476 (D. Ariz. Nov. 25, 1998);
8
 see also Compl. 
¶21, Johnson v. Fla., No. 87-cv-369 (M.D. Fla.) (United States alleged that 
supervisors violated substantive due process by failing to protect hospital patients 
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 Available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/split/documents/arizbrf.php. 
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 Available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/split/documents/gpwcomp.php. 
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Iqbal has not changed the United States’ litigating position.  In United States 
v. Erie County, No. 09-cv-849, 2010 WL 2737131 (W.D.N.Y. July 9, 2010), the 
United States recently amended its complaint to add supervisory liability 
allegations that are based on the same theory that plaintiffs seek to pursue in this 
case.  See Am. Compl ¶21, United States v. Erie County, No. 09 Civ. 849 
(W.D.N.Y. July 23, 2010) (alleging that defendants disregarded known and serious 
risks of harm to detainees);
10
 id. at ¶22 (alleging that defendants ―have repeatedly 
failed to take reasonable measures to prevent staff from inflicting serious harm on 
inmates‖), id. at ¶23, 27, 31, 35 (alleging that subordinates’ unconstitutional 
conduct was caused by supervisors’ failure to adopt policies necessary to prevent 
such violations), id. at ¶24, 28, 32, 36 (failure to train allegations), ¶25, 29, 33, 37 
(failure to discipline or supervise allegations). Thus, the United States seeks to 
hold Appellees to a standard it does not apply to itself. 
Even when the United States is not a formal litigant, it has taken positions at 
odds with that of Appellants’ here.  In the Ninth Circuit, CRD filed an amicus brief 
arguing that a district court improperly granted judgment as a matter of law on 
punitive damages, in part arguing that punitive damages, like supervisory liability, 
was necessary to ensuring adequate enforcement of civil rights laws.  See Br. of 
United States as Amicus Curiae, Reed v. Penasquitos Casablanca Owner’s Ass’n, 
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Nos. 08-55069, 08-55072, 08-55151, 381 F. App’x 674, 2010 WL 2232339 (9th 
Cir. June 2, 2010) (brief filed Nov. 6, 2008).
11
  The government drew a useful 
comparison between punitive damages and supervisory liability and adopted a 
standard for supervisory liability that is far broader than what the United States 
argues in its defensive posture in this case.  See id. at 27–28 (citing law indicating 
that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ―supervisory inaction‖ can be reckless when 
defendant failed to act on knowledge of illegality).  In so doing, the United States 
favorably cited the pre-Iqbal supervisory liability standard from the First Circuit, 
in which that court applied a deliberate indifference standard for supervisory 
liability in police misconduct.  See id. at 27 (citing Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. 
Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 562 (1st Cir. 1989), with approval).  The Ninth Circuit 
ultimately agreed with the United States’ position.  See Reed v. Penasquitos 
Casablanca Owner's Ass'n, Nos. 08-55069, 08-55072, 08-55151, 381 F. App’x 
674, 2010 WL 2232339, at *2 (9th Cir. June 2, 2010).  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit 
held that a defendant’s ―reckless indifference‖ was sufficient to entitle a plaintiff to 
punitive damages, and that a plaintiff could show such indifference by 
demonstrating that the defendant knew of unlawful conduct by subordinates and 
failed to take any action.  Id. 
                                         
11
 Available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/briefs/reedbrief.pdf. 
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Several of CRD’s pre-litigation letters to state and local government 
agencies are also worth noting.  These letters present CRD’s findings regarding 
constitutional violations and its recommendations for preventing their recurrence, 
and they reflect CRD’s recognition that supervisory oversight of governmental 
agency operations and staff is essential as a practical matter to preventing 
constitutional violations by lower-level officials.  When such violations occur in a 
recurrent or systematic way, improved supervision is almost always an essential 
component of an effective remedy. 
For example, when investigating the Mercer County, New Jersey Geriatric 
Center, CRD found widespread constitutional violations and recommended, among 
other remedial measures, meaningful training, investigation, and follow-up of 
incidents of abuse.  See Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Ass’t Attorney General, to 
Robert D. Prunetti, County Executive (Oct. 9, 2002) (findings letter).
12
  CRD 
similarly drew a link between inadequate supervision and unconstitutional conduct 
when investigating a Woodbridge, New Jersey facility.  See Letter from Alexander 
Acosta, Ass’t Attorney General, to Hon. James E. McGreevey, at 3, 34–36 (Nov. 
12, 2004)
13
 (findings with respect to Woodbridge Developmental Ctr.) (detailing 
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minimal supervision and training recommendations to prevent unconstitutional 
harm); see also Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Ass’t Attorney General, to Hon. 
James E. McGreevey, at 5 (Apr. 8, 2003)
14
 (findings with respect to New Lisbon 
Developmental Ctr.) (identifying lack of staff training and incident reporting as 
one cause of unconstitutional failure to protect from harm); Letter from Thomas E. 
Perez, Ass’t Attorney General, to Hon. Jack Markell, at 14 (Nov. 9, 2010)
15
 
(findings with respect to the Del. Psychiatric Ctr.) (criticizing lack of investigation 
of incidents of abuse and lack of interventions to ―minimize or eliminate risks of 
harm‖).  As CRD observed when investigating the Virgin Islands Police 
Department, ―[p]olicies and procedures are the primary means by which police 
departments communicate their standards and expectations to their officers,‖ and 
thus supervisory oversight and training is essential to remedying constitutional 
misconduct.  Letter from Shanetta Y. Cutlar, Chief, Special Litig. Section, to 
Comm’r Elton Lewis, Virgin Islands Police Dep’t, at 2, 22–27 (Oct. 5, 2005).
16
  
Outside of the Third Circuit, CRD has made similar findings, criticizing law 
enforcement officials who fail to provide policy guidance on use of force, fail to 
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review incidents of abuse, and fail to train their officers.  See Letter from Loretta 
King, Acting Ass’t Attorney General, to Raymond P. Fitzpatrick, Jr., Esq. 
[―Yonkers Letter‖], at 5, 17, 18, 30 (June 9, 2009)
17
 (investigation of Yonkers 
Police Dep’t); Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Ass’t Attorney General, to Hon. 
Andrew J. Spano, County Executive [―Westchester Letter‖], at 32–35 (Nov. 19, 
2009)
18
 (findings with respect to Westchester County Jail) (detailing 
recommendations regarding changes in supervision necessary to prevent 
unconstitutional uses of force); Letter from Loretta King, Acting Ass’t Attorney 
General, to Martin N. Gusman, Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff, at 5–6, 9–10, 24–
25 (Sept. 11, 2009)
19
 (findings with respect to Orleans Parish Prison Sys.) 
(providing recommendations on oversight remedies to prevent excessive use of 
force); Letter from Loretta King, Acting Ass’t Attorney General, to Hon. Chris 
Collins, County Executive, at 41 (July 15, 2009)
20
 (findings with respect to Erie 
County Holding Ctr. and Erie County Correctional Facility) (recommending 
oversight and training on use of force).  As CRD has stated succinctly on numerous 
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 Available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/split/documents/parish_findlet.pdf. 
 
20




occasions, supervisory oversight is ―critical‖ to ensure that subordinates’ conduct 
is consistent with constitutional standards.  Yonkers Letter at 18; see also 
Westchester Letter at 7 (―To ensure reasonably safe conditions, officials must take 
measures to prevent the use of unnecessary and inappropriate force by staff.‖).  
Thus, although the United States takes a contrary position here, it has 
consistently argued for a broad reading of supervisory liability in affirmative 
litigation, precisely because of the close link between supervisory inaction to 
unconstitutional conduct by subordinates. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants’ arguments regarding supervisory 
liability should be rejected and the district court’s decision affirmed. 
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